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1. Motivation and Idea 
With the rise of narratology during the 20th century narratological concepts such as narrator, 
fictional world and plot have become increasingly important tools for approaching literary texts. 
However, research over the past decades has substantiated the suspicion that many narra-
tological concepts are ill-understood.1 Thus, it is one of the most pressing desiderata of literary 
studies to improve the understanding of narratological notions. Ways of doing so include giving 
precise definitions, scrutinizing application conditions, and investigating the structure of narra-
tological concepts by specifying which notions are fundamental and which are derivative. 
Relatedly, the interdependencies between narratological concepts and interpretation remain to 
be clarified. It is often presumed that narratological concepts are neutral with respect to inter-
pretation in at least two ways: (i) they can be invoked by any school of interpretation and (ii) 
applying them is not an interpretative move.2 These assumptions, however, have been chal-
lenged.3 It is therefore time to reassess how narratology relates to interpretation. 
Since all of the above is essentially conceptual work it is natural to seek support from experts 
in dealing with concepts. Analytic philosophy seems particularly apt because it provides power-
ful tools and methodological means to guide and focus the envisaged research. Moreover, ana-
lytic aesthetics already offers decades of research relating to the foundations of literary theory.4 
However, exchange between the disciplines has been rather modest. This may be, in part, due 
to the fact that philosophical research is often ignorant of the needs, insights and theoretical 
frameworks of literary studies. The result is rather unfortunate. Frequently, philosophers do not 
capture the concepts literary scholars are after. And even if they do, their results cannot be put 
to use when interpreting literary texts. 
The idea of the workshop Narratological Concepts and Interpretation was to support ongoing 
endeavors of shedding light on narratological concepts and interpretation by bringing literary 
scholars and philosophers who work on these issues together. Contributions were supposed to 
tackle either particular narratological concepts or more general issues concerning interpretation, 
narratology or the relationship between these two. The long-term goal of the organizers 
(Christian Folde, PhD student in philosophy, and Janina Jacke, PhD student in literary studies) 
is to promote cooperation and exchange between philosophy and literary studies. In particular, 
the organizers hope to launch a series of workshops concerning issues at the intersection of the 
two disciplines. 
The workshop took place from December 12th-13th at the University of Hamburg and was 
sponsored by PHLOX, a philosophical research group headed by Prof. Benjamin Schnieder, 
and heureCLÉA, a literary studies project led by Prof. Jan Christoph Meister. Speakers included 
(in order of appearance): Prof. Tilmann Köppe, Dr. Christiana Werner, Dr. Stacie Friend, Dr. 
Thomas Petraschka, and Prof. Peter Lamarque. In the following, we will give a brief summary 
of each talk and appendant discussion. We conclude by indicating how our idea of pooling 
philosophers and literary scholars panned out.  
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2. Köppe on Narrative Closure 
In his talk »Narrative Closure« Tilmann Köppe (Göttingen) primarily addressed the diffi-
culties in defining the narratological concept of narrative closure – roughly, the property of 
stories to have a proper ending. Different approaches to the phenomenon indicate that there are 
no shared intuitions concerning both concrete cases and the grounds for classification (textual 
features vs. response-dependence). However, the project of defining narrative closure can still 
be of some use since it can provide important insights concerning the phenomenon. In the re-
maining part of the talk, Köppe analyzed a definition proposed by Noël Carroll. According to 
Carroll, a narrative exhibits narrative closure if and only if it evokes in its informed reader a 
feeling of finality which is brought about if and only if the reader realizes that all presiding 
macro-questions posed by the plot of the narrative have been answered. The main challenges 
of this approach include (i) that readers’ feelings of closure do not necessarily coincide with 
questions being answered, (ii) that plot and/or macro-questions are difficult to identify, and (iii) 
that it leaves open the question of whether closure is a gradable phenomenon. 
One of the issues in the discussion was the question what exactly the bearer of the property of 
narrative closure is: the narrative, the plot, or something else. It was also questioned whether 
all fictional narratives exhibit closure (alleged counterexample: Beckett), and whether closure 
is not a phenomenon in non-fictional narratives and in music, too.  
3. Werner on Emotions towards Fictional Characters 
Christiana Werner’s (Göttingen) talk »The problem with The Purple Rose of Cairo: fictional 
characters as intentional objects of emotions« focused on the question of how the fact that we 
can have emotions towards fictional characters affects theories of emotions and ontological 
accounts of fictional characters. Werner started by describing the so called paradox of fiction 
which arises from the following three assumptions: (i) the emotions a person S experiences 
towards fictional characters are genuine (Response Condition), (ii) does not believe that fic-
tional characters exist (Belief Condition), and (iii) in order to have genuine emotions towards 
objects of a kind k one has to believe that objects of kind k exist (Coordination Condition). 
There are several solution strategies to the paradox discussed in the literature. Werner focused 
on three of them: (a) accept all three claims but assume that S’s emotions towards fictional 
characters are inconsistent (Radford), (b) reject the Response Condition and argue that the emo-
tions S has towards fictional characters are not genuine but quasi-emotions (Walton), and (c) 
deny the Belief Condition by accepting a popular version of fictional realism, viz. that fictional 
objects exist and that they are abstract, i.e. non-spatial, artefacts. According to Werner, neither 
of these solutions is convincing. Radford’s approach classifies too many of our emotions as 
irrational. Walton’s approach presupposes intentional pretense of our emotions towards fic-
tional characters, which contradicts our experience. Fictional realism, finally, needs to explain 
how fictional entities – conceived of as abstract objects – can be intentional objects of emotions. 
Among other things the discussion addressed the idea that rationality does not necessarily seem 
to be an adequate requirement for emotions in the first place. However, Werner pointed out that 
some component theories of emotions take beliefs to be components of emotions, which makes 
irrationality a possible feature of emotions.  
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4. Friend on Truth in Fiction 
The second day of the workshop started with Stacie Friend’s (London) talk »Realism and 
Reality«. Friend addressed the problem of truth in fiction by defending the reality principle (or: 
principle of minimal departure). As is well known, what is true in a story – roughly, what a 
work of fiction authorizes us to imagine – exceeds what is explicitly stated in the text. Friend’s 
basic idea is that stories, whether fiction or non-fiction, invite us to imagine about the real 
world. The naïve reality principle has it that everything that is actually true is true in a story. 
Obviously, this needs refinements since what is explicitly true in a story may contradict reality. 
The standard formulation respects this requirement by invoking a counterfactual: given all ex-
plicit story truths p1-pn, something q is true in a story if and only if, were it the case that p1-pn, 
then it would be the case that q.  
However, according to Friend, this formulation is too strong because primary story truths are 
not the only reason for departure from reality. Her modified principle of reality reads: given all 
explicit story truths p1-pn, something q is true in a story if and only if, if it was the case that p1-
pn, then it would be the case that q, except if a correct interpretation of the work requires other-
wise.  
Her arguments in favor of the reality principle included empirical evidence that knowledge 
about the real world actually plays an important role when interpreting story worlds. Friend 
closed her talk by defending the principle against several objections and came to the conclusion 
that the reality principle, in comparison with alternative principles, has the most accurate scope 
in identifying story truths. Thus, it not only describes the actual practice of interpreting story 
worlds, but can also be taken as a normative guideline to interpretation. 
In discussing the question of how knowledge on story worlds can be acquired the talk gave 
important insights on the relation between narratological histoire-concepts and interpretation. 
However, one important weakness of Friend’s account was pointed out in the discussion: the 
exception clause Friend added to her version of the reality principle (»except if a correct inter-
pretation of the work states otherwise«) makes it virtually invulnerable to counter-examples. 
5. Petraschka on Intentions and Interpretation 
Thomas Petraschka’s (Regensburg) opened his talk »On categorial and semantic intentions and 
on their relevance for interpretation, theory of fiction and narratology« by elaborating on 
Levinson’s distinction between semantic intentions – what meaning does the author wish to 
express with his text? – and categorial intentions – what type of text does the author wish to 
produce? According to Petraschka the distinction is problematic since two commonly given 
distinctive criteria do not seem to hold: neither are categorial intentions infallibly instantiated 
nor can they be infallibly identified.  
In the second part of his talk Petraschka criticized Levinson’s proposal that actual intention-
alism should be applied to identify the text type whereas hypothetical intentionalism helps iden-
tify the meaning of a text. Since we cannot clearly distinguish between semantic and categorical 
intentions Levinson’s proposal has to be rejected. In addition, the distinction seems unfit to 
solve the main problem of actual intentionalism: the fact that the implementation of intentions 
in a text can fail. 
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The discussion focused on the question what exactly categorical intentions are (are they 
Gricean?) and whether they are sufficient for the determination of a text type (what about stand-
ard and non-standard features?). In addition, categorical intentions seem to play different roles 
in determining whether something is an artwork, a work of fiction, or of a particular genre. 
6. Lamarque on The Opacity of Narrative 
The final talk of the workshop was given by Peter Lamarque (York) on »Interpretation and 
the Opacity of Narrative«. By the opacity of narrative Lamarque points to the characteristic of 
narratives that the represented world is inseparable from the way in which it is presented. This 
includes referential opacity (i.e. the idea that substitution of co-extensional terms changes the 
content of a narrative) as well as representational opacity (i.e., the idea that if a fictional narra-
tive represents an object a, and a is identical to b, it does not represent b). Narratives aim at 
representation instead of being merely the end product of a causal process (like photographs). 
However, opacity – at least in the former sense – is not an intrinsic feature of literary narratives. 
Instead, the question of whether form and content are inseparable depends on the interests 
brought to the text: we decide to read for opacity when we lay emphasis on the way in which 
narrative content is presented. In the remaining part of his talk, Lamarque used a scene from 
Jane Eyre to demonstrate how reading for opacity can not only bring out the brilliance of a 
literary work and heighten our reading pleasure, but also helps us interpret literature in the way 
that it makes us explore ways of reflecting on the fictional world and heightens our experience 
of that world. 
It was pointed out in the discussion that if we read for opacity then the exact linguistic wording 
may matter. Consequently, even a translation of a poem, say, into another language would result 
in there being two different literary works. In contrast to literature scientific prose must be 
transparent: if the enterprise of science is to work, then there have to be different ways of saying 
the same thing (in the same as well as in other languages). 
7. Conclusion 
Judging from its content the workshop succeeded in collecting some perspectives from philos-
ophy and literary studies on narratological concepts and interpretation. However, the workshop 
was not as thematically focused as one might have wished. Moreover, all talks were more on 
the philosophical side of things – a genuine literary studies perspective in terms of historical 
surveys or literary interpretations was lacking. All contributions focused on the theory of fiction 
in the wide sense and can be characterized as more or less analytically aesthetic. At the same 
time the shared common theoretical background resulted in informed and lively discussions. 
This is not to be expected in general when philosophers and literary scholars come together and 
exchange ideas about common issues. In fact, we suspect that the selection of speakers greatly 
helped to enable a smooth exchange between disciplines without fundamental differences in 
methodology. Putting this consensus into question could be a possibility for a future workshop. 
The workshop very much focused on theory. Many literary scholars, however, look for appli-
cations of theory in their everyday work. Having this practical perspective on board would cer-
tainly be a desideratum for workshops to come. 
 5 
Christian Folde / Janina Jacke 
Universität Hamburg 
Philosophisches Seminar / Institut für Germanistik 
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The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52:4 (1994), 429-35; Richard Walsh, Who is the Narrator?, Poetics 
Today 18:4 (1997), 495-513; Berys Gaut, The Philosophy of the Movies: Cinematic Narration, in Peter Kivy (ed.), 
The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics, Malden, Mass. et al. 2004, 230-53; Andrew Kania, Against the Ubiquity of 
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Is Narratology? Questions and Answers Regarding the Status of a Theory, Berlin et al. 2003, 205-219. This 
position can be seen as a consequence of the structuralist roots of narratology (cp. Roland Barthes, Introduction to 
the Structural Analysis of Narratives, in idem, Image Music Text, New York 1977, 79–124; Gérard Genette, 
Discours du récit, in idem, Figures III, Paris 1972, 67–282). 
3 Skeptical accounts are often linked to the position of cognitive narratology (cp. David Herman, D.: Cognitive 
Narratology, in Peter Hühn et al. (eds.): The Living Handbook of Narratology, http://wikis.sub.uni-
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